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Abstract
We investigate the comparative statics of ”more ambiguity aversion” as de-
fined by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005) in the context of the static
two-asset portfolio problem. It is not true in general that more ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the uncertain asset. We exhibit some suffi-
cient conditions to guarantee that, ceteris paribus, an increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset, and raises the equity
premium. For example, this is the case when the set of plausible distribu-
tions of returns can be ranked according to the monotone likelihood ratio
order. We also show how ambiguity aversion distorts the price kernel in the
alternative portfolio problem with complete markets for contingent claims.
Keywords: Smooth ambiguity aversion, monotone likelihood ratio, eq-
uity premium, portfolio choice, price kernel, central dominance.
1 Introduction
In this paper, we examine the standard static portfolio problem with one
safe asset and one uncertain asset. The investor perceives ambiguity about
what the true probability distribution for the excess return of the uncertain
asset is. This ambiguity is expressed by a second order prior probability
distribution over the set of plausible (first order) distributions of the excess
return. Following Segal (1987) and Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005)
(hereafter KMM), we introduce ambiguity attitude by relaxing reduction of
first and second order probabilities. In words, the investor does not evaluate
in the same way asset 1 yielding a return of 20% with probability p and asset
2 yielding a return of 20% with an unknown probability whose expectation
is p, unlike in the standard Bayesian expected utility framework. Following
KMM, we assume that the investor is ambiguity averse in the sense that he
dislikes any mean-preserving spread in the space of first order probability dis-
tributions of excess returns. For example, he prefers asset 1 to asset 2. KMM
proposes a nice decision criteria called ”smooth ambiguity aversion” to char-
acterize such preferences under uncertainty. For a given portfolio allocation,
the ex ante welfare of the investor is measured by computing the (second
order) expectation of a concave function φ of the (first order) expected util-
ity u of final consumption conditional to each plausible distribution of the
excess return. As usual, the concavity of the utility function u expresses
risk aversion in the special case of risky acts, i.e. acts entailing consequences
whose plausible probability distribution is unique. When φ is linear, we are
back to the standard expected utility model in which the uncertain context
can be reduced to a single compound probability distribution. When φ is
concave, the investor is ambiguity averse, and the reduction of compound
distributions does not hold.
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Interestingly enough, KMM also define the comparative notion of ”more
ambiguity aversion”. Consider two agents, respectively with function φ1
and φ2, who have the same beliefs expressed by the set of first and second
order probability distributions. Suppose also that they have the same utility
function u to evaluate risky acts. Agent φ2 is more ambiguity averse than
agent φ1 if φ1 prefers an uncertain act over a pure risky one whenever φ2
does so. This is true if and only if function φ2 is more concave than function
φ1, in the sense of Arrow-Pratt: −φ002/φ02 is uniformly larger than −φ001/φ01. In
this paper, we examine the effect of such an increase in ambiguity aversion
on the optimal demand for the uncertain asset. By doing so, we fix the first
and second order beliefs, and the utility function u. We examine the effect
of a concave transformation of function φ on the optimal portfolio.
The KMM model has two attractive features in comparison to other mod-
els of ambiguity such as the pioneering maxmin expected utility (or multiple-
prior) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). First, it organizes a nice sep-
aration between ambiguity aversion and ambiguity, i.e., between tastes and
beliefs. Without this feature, we could not perform the comparative statics
of more ambiguity aversion. Second, the KMM model applies the expected
utility machinery sequentially, first on order probability distributions, and
then on the second order distribution. This allows us to exploit the huge ar-
mory of techniques amassed over the years to tackle questions involving risk
under the expected utility framework to the analysis of problems involving
non-expected utility involving ambiguity. This paper illustrates this point.
This question of the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion for the
portfolio problem is parallel to the one of risk aversion. Since Arrow (1963)
and Pratt (1964), it is well known that an increase in risk aversion reduces
the demand for the risky asset. It is therefore quite surprising that, as we
show in this paper, it is not true in general that more ambiguity aversion
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reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset. For cleverly chosen - but still
not spurious - set of priors for the return of the risky asset, we show that
the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases the investor’s demand for
the ambiguous asset. The intuition for why such counterexamples may ex-
ist can be explained as follows. The first-order condition of the portfolio
problem with ambiguity aversion can be rewritten to take the form that it
would take under expected utility, but with a distortion in the way the dif-
ferent first order probability distributions on excess return are compounded.
Under expected utility, i.e., ambiguity neutrality, the compounding is made
by using the true second order probability distribution. Under ambiguity
aversion, this second order probability distribution is distorted by putting
more weight on the plausible second order distributions yielding a smaller
expected utility, as first observed by Taboga (2005). In spite of the fact
that the ambiguity averse investor’s beliefs cannot be reduced to a single
compound probability distribution over excess returns, the introduction of
ambiguity aversion is observationally equivalent to the effect of distorting
the compound distribution used by the ambiguity-neutral investor. This dis-
tortion is pessimistic. It is well known from expected utility theory that
pessimistic deteriorations in beliefs do not always reduce the demand for the
risky asset.1 As for Giffen goods in consumer theory, this deterioration in
the terms of trade yields a wealth effect that may raise the asset demand.
The main objective of the paper is to characterize conditions under which
more ambiguity aversion reduces the optimal exposure to uncertainty. This
can be done by restricting either the set of utility functions and/or the set of
possible priors. If we assume that the set of priors can be ranked according
to the first-degree or second-degree stochastic dominance orders (FSD/SSD),
1See Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), Fishburn and Porter (1976), Meyer and Ormiston
(1985), Hadar and Seo (1990), Gollier (1995), Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995), Abel (2002)
and Athey (2002), and the bibliographical references in these papers.
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we exhibit some simple sufficient conditions on the utility function to obtain
an unambiguous comparative static property of the introduction of ambigu-
ity aversion. These results are derived by using the following technique. It
happens that any increase in ambiguity aversion deteriorates the observation-
ally equivalent second order distribution in a very specific way. It transfers
more weight on the worse priors in the sense of the monotone likelihood ratio
(MLR) order. This puts a very specific structure to the notion of pessimism
entailed by more ambiguity aversion. For example, if the plausible priors can
be order according to FSD, their compound through the MLR deteriorated
second order probability distribution generated by more ambiguity aversion
entails a FSD deterioration of the behaviorally equivalent changes of beliefs
under expected utility. This implies that, under this assumption, the follow-
ing two problems are linked : 1) under the EU model, what are the conditions
on the utility function u that guarantee that any FSD deterioration in the
distribution of excess return of the risky asset reduces the demand for it;
and 2) in the KMM model, what are the conditions that guarantee that any
increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset?
The same property holds when replacing FSD by SSD. More sophisticated
methods are required when considering other stochastic orders to rank plau-
sible priors for the excess return. Let us just mention at this stage the result
that is easiest to express: if the plausible priors can be ranked according to
MLR (a special case of FSD), then it is always true that more ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset.
It is easy to translate these results about the effect of comparative am-
biguity aversion on the demand for the ambiguous asset into its effect on
the equity premium. Thus, our work is related to the recent developments
about the effect of ambiguity aversion on the equity premium. Ju and Miao
(2009) and Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2009) examine a dy-
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namic infinite-horizon portfolio problem in which the representative investor
exhibits smooth ambiguity aversion and faces time-varying ambiguity about
the second order distribution of the plausible probability distributions of con-
sumption growth. These two papers consider different sets of risk-ambiguity
attitudes (u, φ), and different stochastic processes for the first and second or-
der probability distributions. They both use numerical analyses to solve the
calibrated dynamic portfolio problem. They both conclude that ambiguity
aversion raises the equity premium. Our paper demonstrates that these re-
sults are specific to the calibration under scrutiny. Other papers conclude in
the same direction, but using other decision criterion for ambiguity aversion,
either maxmin expected utility, Choquet expected utility, or robust control
theory.2
The portfolio problem and two illustrations are presented in Section 2.
Our main results are presented in Section 3 in which we derive sufficient con-
ditions for the comparative statics of more ambiguity aversion. In Section 4,
we examine a Lucas economy with a representative agent facing ambiguous
state probabilities. We show how the ambiguity aversion of the representa-
tive agent affects the equity premium, the price kernel of the economy, and
individual asset prices.
2 The smooth ambiguity model applied to
the portfolio problem
Our model is static with two assets. The first asset is safe with a rate of return
that is normalized to zero. The risky asset has a return x whose distribution
is ambiguous in the sense that it is sensitive to some parameter θ whose true
2See for example Dow and Werlang (1992), Chen and Epstein (2002), Epstein and
Wang (1994), Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Maenhout (2004), Hansen and Sargent
(2008).
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value is unknown. The investor is initially endowed with wealth w0. If he
invests α in the risky asset, his final wealth will be w0 + αx conditional to a
realized return x of the risky asset.
The ambiguity of the uncertain asset is characterized by a set Π =
{F1, ..., Fn} of plausible cumulative probability distributions for ex. Let exθ
denote the random variable distributed as Fθ. We suppose that the sup-
port of all priors are bounded in [x−, x+], with x− < 0 < x+. Based on his
subjective information, the investor associates a second order probability dis-
tribution (q1, ..., qn) over the set of priors Π, with Σnθ=1qθ = 1, where qθ ≥ 0
is the probability that Fθ be the true probability distribution of excess re-
turns. We hereafter denote eθ for the random variable (1, q1; 2; q2; ...;n, qn).
Following Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), we assume that the pref-
erences of the investor exhibit smooth ambiguity aversion. For each plau-
sible probability distribution Fθ, the investor computes the expected utility
U(α, θ) = Eu(w0 + αexθ) = R u(w0 + αx)dFθ(x) conditional to Fθ being the
true distribution. We assume that u is increasing and concave, so that U(., θ)
is concave in the investment α in the ambiguous asset, for all θ. Ex ante, for
a given portfolio allocation α, the welfare of the agent is measured by V (α)
with
V (α) = φ−1
Ã
nX
θ=1
qθφ(U(α, θ))
!
= φ−1
Ã
nX
θ=1
qθφ (Eu(w0 + αexθ))! ,
V (α) can be interpreted as the certainty equivalent of the uncertain con-
ditional expected utility U(α, eθ). The shape of φ describes the investor’s
attitude towards ambiguity. A linear φ means that the investor is neutral to
ambiguity, and that he can reduce compound probability distributions to a
single one ΣθqθFθ. On the contrary, a concave φ is synonymous of ambiguity
aversion in the sense that the DM dislikes any mean-preserving spread of the
conditional expected utility U(α, eθ).
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An interesting particular case arises when the absolute ambiguity aver-
sion η(U) = −φ00(U)/φ0(U) is constant, so that φ(U) = −η−1 exp(−ηU).
As proved by Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), the ex ante welfare
V (α) essentially exhibits a maxmin expected utility functional V MEU(α) =
minθ Eu(w0 + αexθ) a` la Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) when the degree η of
absolute ambiguity aversion tends to infinity.
The optimal portfolio allocation α∗ maximizes the ex ante welfare of the
investor V (α). Because φ is increasing, α∗ is the solution of the following
program:
α∗ ∈ argmax
α
nX
θ=1
qθφ (Eu(w0 + αexθ)) . (1)
If φ and u are strictly concave, the objective function is concave in α and
the solution to program (1), when it exists, is unique. Let us observe that
the demand for the ambiguous asset shares its sign with the equity premium
Eex = ΣθqθEexθ. All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
Lemma 1 The demand for the ambiguous asset is positive (zero/negative)
if the equity premium is positive (zero/negative).
This means that ambiguity aversion, as risk aversion, has a second order
nature, as defined by Segal and Spivak (1990). As soon as the equity premium
is positive, the demand for the ambiguous asset is positive, independent of
the degree of ambiguity surrounding the distribution of returns. We hereafter
assume that the equity premium is positive, so that α∗ is positive.
In the remainder of this section, we examine two illustrations. Consider
first the following special case in which an analytical solution can be found
for α∗:
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• Priors are normally distributed with the same variance σ2, and with
Eexθ = θ : exθ ∼ N(θ, σ);3
• The ambiguity on the equity premium θ is itself normally distributed:eθ ∼ N(μ, σ0);
• The investor’s preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion: u(z) =
−A−1 exp−Az ∈ R−;
• The investor’s preferences exhibit constant relative ambiguity aversion:
φ(U) = −(−U)1+γ/(1 + γ). This function is increasing in R− and is
concave in this domain if γ is positive.
As is well-known, the normality of the priors and the constancy of absolute
risk aversion implies that the Arrow-Pratt approximation is exact.4 This
implies in turn that
U(α, θ) = −A−1 exp−A
¡
w0 + αθ − 0.5Aα2σ2
¢
. (2)
Because φ(U) is an exponential function of θ, and because eθ is normally
distributed, the same trick can be used to compute Eφ. It yields
V (α) = −A−1 exp−A(w0 + αμ− 0.5Aα2(σ2 + (1 + γ)σ20)). (3)
The optimal demand for the risky asset is thus equal to
α∗ =
μ
A(σ2 + (1 + γ)σ20)
. (4)
We see that under ambiguity (σ20 > 0), the demand for the risky asset is de-
creasing in the relative degree γ of ambiguity aversion of the investor. This
exponential-power specification for (u, φ) differs from the other three papers
3It is easy to extend this to the case of an ambiguous variance.
4For a simple proof, see for example Gollier (2001, page 57).
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existing on this topic. Taboga (2005) examines an exponential-exponential
specification. Ju and Miao (2009) used a power-power specification, whereas
Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2009) used a power-exponential spec-
ification. None of these three alternative problems can be solved analytically.
Consider alternatively the following counterexample such that
• n = 2, ex1 ∼ (−1, 2/10;−0.25, 3/20; 0.75, 7/20; 1.25, 3/10) and ex2 ∼
(−1, 1/5; 0, 1/5; 1, 3/5);
• q1 = 5% and q2 = 95%;
• u(z) = min(z, 3 + 0.3(z − 3)) and w0 = 2;
• φ(U) = −η−1 exp(−ηU).
It is easy to check that ex1 is riskier than ex2 in the sense of Rothschild
and Stiglitz (1970). We solved this problem numerically. Below a minimum
threshold around 20 for the degree η of ambiguity aversion, the optimal hold-
ing of the ambiguous asset equals α∗ = 1. However, above this threshold,
the introduction of ambiguity aversion increases α∗ above the optimal in-
vestment of the ambiguity-neutral investor. For example, α∗ equals 1.204
when η = 50. When η tends to infinity, the optimal investment in the risky
asset tends to α∗ = 4/3, which is the optimal holding of the ambiguous as-
set for an ambiguity-neutral investor who believes that the distribution of
excess return is ex1 with certainty. In terms of portfolio allocation, it is ob-
servationally equivalent to increase absolute ambiguity aversion from zero to
infinity or to replace beliefs ey1 ∼ (ex1, 5%; ex2, 95%) by ey2 ∼ (ex1, 100%) under
expected utility. Notice that because ex1 is riskier than ex2, the extreme beliefey2 is riskier than ey1 in the sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz. This example
illustrates the fact — first observed by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971) — that
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it is not true in general that a riskier distribution of excess return reduces
the demand for the risky asset in the expected utility model.
3 Effect of an increase of ambiguity aversion
The beliefs are represented by the set of priors (ex1, ..., exn) of the excess return
of the risky asset, together with the second order distribution (q1, ..., qn) on
these priors. We compare two agents with the same beliefs and the same
concave utility function u, but with different attitudes toward ambiguity
represented by concave functions φ1 and φ2. The demand for the risky asset
by agent φ1 is expressed by α∗1 which must satisfy the following first-order
condition:
nX
θ=1
qθφ01(U(α
∗
1, θ))Eexθu0(w0 + α∗1exθ) = 0. (5)
Following Klibanoff, Marinacci and Mukerji (2005), we assume that the
agent with function φ2 is more ambiguity averse than agent φ1 in the sense
that there exists an increasing and concave transformation function k such
that φ2(U) = k(φ1(U)) for all U in the relevant domain. We would like to
characterize conditions under which the more ambiguity averse agent φ2 has
a smaller demand for the risky asset than agent φ1: α∗2 ≤ α∗1. This would
be the case if and only if
nX
θ=1
qθφ02(U(α
∗
1, θ))Eexθu0(w0 + α∗1exθ) ≤ 0. (6)
We would like to find conditions under which it is always true that (5) implies
(6). Notice that this condition can be rewritten as
Eey1u0(w0 + α∗1ey1) = 0 =⇒ Eey2u0(w0 + α∗1ey2) ≤ 0, (7)
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where eyi is a compound random variable which equals exθ with probabilitybqiθ, θ = 1, ..., n, such that
bqiθ = qθφ0i(U(α∗1, θ))Pn
t=1 qtφ
0
i(U(α∗1, t))
. (8)
Notice that the left equality in (7) can be interpreted as the first-order con-
dition of the problem maxαEu(w0 + αey1) of an expected-utility-maximizing
investor whose beliefs are represented by ey1 ∼ (ex1, bq11; ...; exn, bq1n). Thus,
the ambiguity averse agent φ1 behaves as an EU-maximizing agent who
would distort his second order beliefs from (q1, ..., qn) to the ”observationally
equivalent probability distribution” bq1 = (bq11, ..., bq1n). The distortion factor
φ01(U(α∗1, θ))/Σtqtφ01(U(α∗1, t)) is a Radon-Nikodym derivative, and the prob-
ability distribution bq1 is analogous to the risk-neutral probability distribution
used in the theory of finance. Notice that the distortion functional described
by equation (8) is endogenous, as it depends upon the portfolio allocation α∗1
selected by the agent. The right inequality in (7) just means that shifting
beliefs from ey1 to ey2 reduces the ambiguity-neutral investor’s holding of the
asset. These findings are summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 The change in preferences from (u, φ1) to (u, φ2) reduces the de-
mand for the ambiguous asset if the EU agent with utility function u reduces
his demand for the risky asset when his beliefs about the excess return shift
from ey1 ∼ (ex1, bq11; ...; exn, bq1n) to ey2 ∼ (ex1, bq21; ...; exn, bq2n), where bqiθ is defined by
(8).
This result was initially due to Taboga (2005). It precisely expresses the
observational equivalence property that we already encountered in the coun-
terexample presented in the previous section. It provides a test to determine
whether more ambiguity aversion reduces demand. Observe that this test
relies on two reduced probability distribution ey1 and ey2. However, it is not
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true that the ambiguity averse investor (u, φ1) uses the corresponding re-
duced probability distribution ey1 to evaluate the optimality of the different
feasible portfolios. If he would do so, he would reevaluate the distribution
of ey1 for each portfolio, since vector bq1 is a function of α. In the smooth
ambiguity aversion model, beliefs cannot be reduced to a single probability
distribution on the state payoffs. But this lemma builds a bridge between the
comparative statics of increased ambiguity aversion and the one of changes
in risk in the classical EU model.
Let us examine how does changing function φ1 into φ2 modify the ob-
servationally equivalent probability distribution of the excess return. A first
answer to this question is provided by the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The following two conditions are equivalent:
1. Agent φ2 is more ambiguity averse than agent φ1;
2. Beliefs bq2 is dominated by bq1 in the sense of the monotone likelihood ra-
tio order, i.e., bq2θ/bq1θ is decreasing in θ, whenever U(α∗1, 1) ≤ U(α∗1, 2) ≤
... ≤ U(α∗1, n).
An increase in ambiguity aversion has an effect on demand that is ob-
servationally equivalent to a MLR-dominated shift in the prior beliefs. In
other words, it distorts beliefs by favoring the worse priors in a very specific
sense: if agent φ1 prefers prior exθ over prior exθ0 , then, compared to agent
φ1, the more ambiguity averse agent φ2 increases the distorted probabilitybq2θ0 relatively more than the probability bq2θ . Lemma 3 provides a justification
to say that, in the case of the portfolio problem, more ambiguity aversion is
observationally equivalent to more pessimism, i.e., to a MLR deterioration
of beliefs. This result is central to prove our next proposition, in which we
consider three dominance orders: first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD),
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second-degree stochastic dominance (SSD), and Rothschild and Stiglitz’s in-
crease in risk (IR).
Proposition 1 Let D be one of the following three stochastic orders: FSD,
SSD or IR. Suppose that Eex > 0, and that (ex1, ..., exn) can be ranked according
to the stochastic order D . It implies that an increase in ambiguity aversion
deteriorates the observationally equivalent probability distribution of the ex-
cess return in the sense of the stochastic order D: If ∃k concave: φ2 = k(φ1)
and ex1 ¹D ex2 ¹D ... ¹D exn, then
ey2 ∼ (ex1, bq21; ...; exn, bq2n) ¹D (ex1, bq11; ...; exn, bq1n) ∼ ey1.
Thus, if priors can be ranked according first-degree stochastic dominance,
the increase in ambiguity aversion modifies the demand for the asset in the
same direction as a FSD deterioration of the excess return in the expected
utility model. The problem is that the comparative statics of an FSD dete-
rioration in the excess return is in general ambiguous in the expected utility
model. The intuition for this negative result is that a reduction in the return
of an asset has a substitution effect and a wealth effect. As for the exis-
tence of Giffen goods in consumption theory, the wealth effect may induce
an increase in the asset demand. Technically, it is not true in general that
condition (7) holds when ey2 ¹FSD ey1. It is easy to see why: By definition of
FSD, this would be true if and only if function f(y) = yu0(w0 + αy) would
be increasing, which is not true in general. As observed by Fishburn and
Porter (1976), a sufficient condition for f to be increasing is that relative
risk aversion R(z) = −zu00(z)/u0(z) be smaller than unity.5 It implies that
this is also a sufficient condition for an increase of ambiguity aversion to
reduce the demand for the ambiguous asset when priors can be ranked ac-
cording to FSD. The same strategy can be used to examine the case when
5This is because f 0(y) = 1−R(w0 + αy) + w0A(w0 + αy), with A(z) = −u00(z)/u0(z).
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priors can be ranked in the sense of Rothschild-Stiglitz increase in risk. In
that case, the above proposition tells us that the observationally equivalent
probability distribution ey2 is an increase in risk compared to ey1. Because f
is not concave, this does not in general imply that condition (7) holds. As
initially shown by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971), it is not true in general
that an increase in risk of the excess return of the risky asset reduces its
demand. Hadar and Seo (1990) provided a sufficient condition, which guar-
antees that f is concave. This condition is that relative prudence is positive
and less than 2, where relative prudence is defined by P (z) = −zu000(z)/u00(z)
(Kimball (1990)). This proves the following result.
Proposition 2 Suppose that u ∈ C3 and Eex > 0. Any increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the risky asset if one of the following two
conditions is satisfied:
1. (ex1, ..., exn) can be ranked according first-degree stochastic dominance,
and R ≤ 1;
2. (ex1, ..., exn) can be ranked according to the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s risk-
iness order, and 0 ≤ P r ≤ 2.
More generally, if the set of marginals can be ranked according to the SSD
order, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the risky as-
set if relative risk aversion is less than unity, and relative prudence is positive
and less than two. In the case of power utility function, relative prudence
equals relative risk aversion plus one. This implies that when relative risk
aversion is constant, and when priors can be ranked according to SSD, any
increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the demand for the ambiguous asset if
relative risk aversion is less than unity. This condition is not very convincing,
14
since relative risk aversion is usually assumed to be larger than unity. Argu-
ments have been provided based on introspection (Dre`ze (1981), Kandel and
Stambaugh (1991), Gollier (2001)) or on the equity premium puzzle that can
be solved in the canonical model only with a degree of relative risk aversion
exceeding 40.
Rather than limiting the set of utility functions yielding an unambiguous
effect, an alternative approach consists in restricting the set of priors. To do
this, let us first introduce the following concepts, which rely on the location-
weighted-probability function Tθ that is defined as follows:
Tθ(x) =
Z x
x−
tdFθ(t). (9)
Following Gollier (1995), we say that ex2 is dominated by ex1 in the sense of
Central Dominance if there exists a nonnegative scalar m such that T2(x) ≤
mT1(x) for all x ∈ [x−, x+].6 Gollier (1995) showed that ex2 ¹CD ex1 is nec-
essary and sufficient to guarantee that all risk-averse investors reduce their
demand for the risky asset whose distribution of excess return goes from ex1 toex2. SSD-dominance is not sufficient for CD-dominance. Notice that ex1 andex2 in the counterexample of the previous section violate the CD condition.
It implies that there exists a concave utility function such that the demand
for the asset is increased when beliefs go from (ex1, 5%; ex2, 95%) to the riskierex1.
Here is a partial list of stochastic orders that have been shown to belong
to the wide set of CD:
6There is no simple interpretation of this stochastic order in the literature. However,
observe that replacing ex1 by ex2 ∼ (ex1,m; 0, 1 − m) implies that T2 = mT1. This pro-
portional probability transfer to the zero excess return has no effect on the risk-averse
investor’s demand for the risky asset. This explains the presence of the arbitrary scalar
m in the definition of CD. Moreover a CD shift with m = 1 requires a reduction of the
location-weighted-probability function T . For example, if one divides a probability mass
p at some return x = r < 0 in two equal masses (p/2, p/2), the transfer of mass to the left
must be to the left of 2r, which is a strong condition.
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• Monotone Likelihood Ratio order (MLR) (Ormiston and Schlee (1993)).
Notice that MLR is a subset of FSD.
• Strong Increase in Risk (Meyer and Ormiston (1985)): The excess re-
turn ex2 is a strong increase in risk with respect to ex1 if they have the
same mean and if any probability mass taken out of some of the real-
izations of ex1 is transferred out of the support of this random variable.
• Simple Increase in Risk (Dionne and Gollier (1992)): Random variableex2 is a simple increase in risk with respect to ex1 if they have the same
mean and x(F1(x)− F2(x)) is nonnegative for all x.
• Monotone Probability Ratio order (MPR) (Eeckhoudt and Gollier (1995),
Athey (2002)): When the two random variables have the same support,
we say that ex2 is dominated by ex1 in the sense of MPR if the cumu-
lative probability ratio F2(x)/F1(x) is nonincreasing. It can be shown
that MPR is more general than MLR, but is still a subset of FSD.
The next result allows us to relax the conditions on u, but at the cost of
restricting the set of priors.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Eex > 0. Any increase in ambiguity aversion
reduces the demand for the risky asset if the set of priors (ex1, ..., exn) can be
ranked according to both SSD dominance and central dominance, that is, ifexθ ¹SSD exθ+1 and exθ ¹CD exθ+1 for all θ = 1, ..., n− 1.
To illustrate, because we know that MLR yields both first-degree sto-
chastic dominance and central dominance, we directly obtain the following
corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose that Eex > 0 and that (ex1, ..., exn) can be ranked accord-
ing to the monotone likelihood ratio order. Then, any increase in ambiguity
aversion reduces the demand for the risky asset.
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In this case, we conclude that ambiguity aversion and risk aversion goes
into the same direction. A more general corollary holds where the MLR order
is replaced by the more general MPR order.
It is noteworthy that the comparative statics of ambiguity aversion is
much simpler when considering market participation. Of course, as observed
in Lemma 1, our basic model is not well fitted to examine this question,
since all agents should have a positive demand for equity as soon as the
equity premium is positive (second order risk aversion).7 Let us introduce a
fixed cost C for market participation, so that the new model is with U(α, θ) =
Eu(w0 − C + αexθ), V (α) = φ−1 (Pθ qθφ(U(α, θ))) , −→α = argmaxV (α), and
α∗ = −→α if V (−→α ) ≥ u(w0), and α∗ = 0 otherwise. Obviously, because V is the
certainty equivalent of U(α, eθ) under function φ, an increase in the concavity
of φ reduces V (α) for all α. Thus the condition for market participation
V (−→α ) ≥ u(w0) is less likely to hold when ambiguity aversion is increased.
This means that ambiguity aversion may explain the market participation
puzzle (Haliassos and Bertaut (1995)).
4 Asset prices with complete markets
In this section, we extend the focus of our analysis to the effect of ambiguity
aversion to the price of contingent claims. Consider a Lucas tree economy
with a risk-averse and ambiguity averse representative agent whose prefer-
ences are characterized by increasing and concave functions (u, φi). Each
agent is endowed with a tree producing an uncertainty quantity of fruits at
the end of the period. There are S possible states of nature, with cs denoting
the number of fruits produced by trees in state s, s = 1, ..., S. The distribu-
7Thus, our story of the role ambiguity aversion to explain the market participation
puzzle differs from the one by Dow and Werlang (1992) and Epstein and Schneider (2007),
who consider a MEU model without participation cost.
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tion of states is subject to some parameter uncertainty. Parameter θ can take
value 1, ..., n with probabilities (q1, ..., qn), and ps|θ is the probability of state
s conditional to θ. Let ps = Σθqθps|θ denote the unconditional probability
of state s. Ex ante, there is a market for contingent claims. Agents trade
claims of fruits contingent on the harvest. Assuming complete markets, the
ambiguity averse and risk-averse agent whose preferences are given by the
pair (u, φi) solves the following problem:
max
(x1,...,xS)
nX
θ=1
qθφi
Ã
SX
s=1
ps|θu(xs)
!
, s.t.
SX
s=1
Πs(xs − cs) = 0,
(10)
where xs−cs is the demand for the Arrow-Debreu security associated to state
s, and Πs is the price of that contingent claim. The first-order conditions for
this program are written as
u0(xs)
"
nX
θ=1
qθφ0i
Ã
SX
s0=1
ps0|θu(xs0)
!
ps|θ
#
= λΠs, (11)
for all s, where λ is the Lagrange multiplier associated to the budget con-
straint. The market-clearing conditions impose that xs = cs for all s, which
implies the following equilibrium state prices :
Πis = bpisu0(cs), (12)
for all s, where the distorted state probability bpis is defined as follows:
bpis = nX
θ=1
bqiθps|θ with bqiθ = qθφ0i (Eu(ecθ))Pn
t=1 qtφ
0
i (Eu(ect)) , (13)
where ecθ is distributed as (c1, p1|θ; ..., cS, pS|θ). Under ambiguity neutrality,
we have that bqiθ = qθ, and bpis is the true probability of state s computed from
the compound first and second order probabilities. The aversion to ambigu-
ity of the representative agent affects the equilibrium state prices in a way
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that is observationally equivalent to a distortion of beliefs in the EU model.
This distortion takes the form of a transformation of the subjective prior
distribution from (q1, ..., qn) to (bqi1, ..., bqin) that is equivalent to the previous
section with ecθ = w0 + α∗1exθ. Lemma 3 implies that bq2 is dominated by bq1 in
the sense of MLR when φ2 is more ambiguity averse than agent φ1. The next
proposition is a direct consequence of this observation.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the set of priors (ec1, ...,ecn) can be ranked ac-
cording the stochastic order D (D =FSD, SSD or IR) . It implies that
an increase in ambiguity aversion deteriorates the observationally equivalent
probability distribution of consumption in the sense of the stochastic or-
der D : If ∃k concave: φ2 = k(φ1) and ec1 ¹D ec2 ¹D ... ¹D ecn , then
(ec1, bq21; ...;ecn, bq2n) ¹D (ec1, bq11; ...;ecn, bq1n).
It is easy to reinterpret this result in terms of the impact of ambiguity
aversion on the price kernel πs = Πs/ps. Suppose that cs 6= cs0 for all (s, s0),
so that we can substitute index s = 1, ..., n by another index s = c1, ..., cS.
In Figure 1, we have drawn the state price πs = bpisu0(cs)/ps as a function of
cs. Under ambiguity neutrality, this is a decreasing function, because u0 is
decreasing. The slope of the curve π(c) describes the degree of risk aversion
of the agent. From Proposition 4, ambiguity aversion tends to reinforce risk
aversion. Indeed, if the priors can be ranked by FSD, an increase in ambiguity
aversion has an effect on asset prices that is observationally equivalent to
a FSD-deteriorating shift in beliefs, i.e., it tends to transfer the distorted
probability mass bp from the good states to the bad ones. The corresponding
shift in πs = bpsu0(cs)/ps is described in Figure 1a. If the priors can be
ranked according to their riskiness, an increase in ambiguity aversion tends
to transfer the distorted probability mass to the extreme states. This implies
convexifying the price kernel, as depicted in Figure 1b.
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u’(c) 
c 
Π 
u’(c) 
c 
a : FSD                                                                   b : IR 
Π 
Figure 1: The effect of an increase in ambiguity aversion on the price kernel,
when the priors can be ranked by the FSD order (a), or by the Rothschild-
Stiglitz riskiness order (b).
The equilibrium price of trees equals Pi = ΣsΠiscs/ΣsΠis. It is easily
checked that this implies that
nX
θ=1
qθφ0i(Eu(ecθ))E [(ecθ − Pi)u0(ecθ)] = 0.
It is intuitive that more ambiguity aversion should reduce the price of equity,
thereby increasing the equity premium. We obtain that P2 is smaller than
P1 if and only the following inequality holds:
nX
θ=1
qθφ02(Eu(ecθ))E [(ecθ − P1)u0(ecθ)] ≤ 0. (14)
Technically, this condition is equivalent to condition (6) with ecθ = w0+α∗1exθ,
α∗1 = 1 and P1 = w0. We conclude this section with the following proposition,
which is a direct consequence of this observation together with the results
presented in the previous section.
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Proposition 5 An increase in ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium
if one of the following conditions is satisfied:
1. (ec1, ...,ecn) can be ranked according first-degree stochastic dominance,
and R ≤ 1;
2. (ec1, ...,ecn) can be ranked according to the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s risk-
iness order, and 0 ≤ P r ≤ 2;
3. (ec1 − P1, ...,ecn − P1) can be ranked according to both Second-degree
Stochastic Dominance and Central Dominance, where P1 is the initial
price of equity.
Property 3 implies for example that the equity premium is increasing
in the degree of ambiguity aversion of the representative agent if the set of
priors (ec1, ...,ecn) can be ranked according to the MLR/MPR order.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explored the determinants of the demand for risky assets
and of asset prices when investors are ambiguity averse. We have shown
that, contrary to the intuition, ambiguity aversion may yield an increase
in the demand for the risky and ambiguous asset, and a reduction in the
demand for the safe one. In the same fashion, it is not true in general that
ambiguity aversion raises the equity premium in the economy. We have first
shown that the qualitative effect of an increase in ambiguity aversion in these
settings is observationally equivalent to that of a shift in the beliefs of the
investor in the standard EU model. If the set of plausible priors can be
ranked according to the first degree stochastic dominance order, this shift
is first degree stochastic deteriorating, whereas it is risk-increasing if these
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priors can be ranked according to the Rothschild-Stiglitz risk order. The
problem originates from the observation already made by Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1971) and Fishburn and Porter (1976) that a FSD/SSD deteriorating
shift in the distribution of the return of the risky asset has an ambiguous effect
on the demand for that asset in the EU framework. We heavily relied on the
literature that emerged from this negative result to provide some sufficient
conditions for any increase in ambiguity aversion to yield a reduction in the
demand for the risky asset and an increase in the equity premium.
In most cases however, an increase in ambiguity aversion reduces the de-
mand for the ambiguous asset, and it raises the equity premium. Two sets
of findings confirm this view. First, the numerical analyses in the existing
literature all go in that direction. We also showed that this is always true
when the first and second order probability distributions are normal, and the
pair (u, φ) are exponential-power functions. Second, some of our sufficient
conditions cover a wide set of realistic situations. For example, if the set of
priors can be ranked according to the well-known monotone likelihood ratio
order, then it is always true that an increase in ambiguity aversion raises the
equity premium. Our conclusion is that the potential existence of a coun-
terintuitive effect of ambiguity aversion plays a role similar to the potential
existence of Giffen goods in consumption theory. The observationally equiv-
alent FSD deterioration of more ambiguity aversion has a wealth effect on
the demand for the asset that may dominate the substitution effect. This
is a rare event, but theoretical progress can rarely be made without under-
standing the mechanism that generates it. After all, the existence of Giffen
goods is taught in Microeconomics 101.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
By concavity of the objective function in (1) with respect to α, we have
that α∗ is positive if the derivative of this objective function with respect to
α evaluated at α = 0 is positive. This derivative is written as
nX
θ=1
qθφ0(u(w0))Eexθu0(w0) = u0(w0)φ0(u(w0))Eex,
where Eex = ΣθqθExθ is the equity premium. This concludes the proof. ¥
Proof of Lemma 3
Because φ1 and φ2 are increasing in U, there exists an increasing function
k such that φ2(U) = k(φ1(U)), or φ02(U) = k0(φ1(U))φ01(U) for all U . Using
definition (8), we obtain that
bq2θbq1θ = k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ))
Pn
t=1 qtφ
0
1 (U(α∗1, t))Pn
t=1 qtφ
0
2 (U(α∗1, t))
(15)
for all θ = 1, ..., n. The Lemma is a direct consequence of (15), in the sense
that the likelihood ratio bq2θ/bq1θ is decreasing in θ if k0 is decreasing in φ1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose that ex1 ¹D ex2 ¹D ... ¹D exn. It implies that U(α∗1, 1) ≤ U(α∗1, 2) ≤
... ≤ U(α∗1, n). We have to prove that (ex1, bq11; ....; exn, bq1n) is preferred to
(ex1, bq21; ....; exn, bq2n) by all utility functions v in C, that is
nX
θ=1
bq2θEv(exθ) ≤ nX
θ=1
bq1θEv(exθ),
where C is the set of increasing functions ifD=FSD, C is the set of increasing
and concave functions if D=SSD, and C is the set of concave functions if
D=IR. Combining the conditions that exθ ¹D exθ+1 and that v ∈ C implies
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that Ev(exθ) is increasing in θ. The above inequality is obtained by combining
this property with the fact that bq2 is dominated by bq1 in the sense of MLR
(Lemma 3), a special case of FSD. ¥
Proof of Proposition 3
The following lemma is useful to prove Proposition 3. Let K denote
interval [minθ α∗θ,maxθ α
∗
θ], where α
∗
θ is the maximand of Eu(w0 + αexθ).
Lemma 4 Consider a specific set of priors (ex1, ..., exn) and a concave utility
function u. They characterize function U defined by U(α, θ) = Eu(w0 +
αexθ). Consider a specific scalar α∗1 in K. The following two conditions are
equivalent:
1. Any agent φ2 that is more ambiguity averse than agent φ1 with demand
α∗1 for the ambiguous asset will have a demand for it that is smaller
than α∗1;
2. There exists θ ∈ {1, ..., n} such that
U(α∗1, θ)Uα(α
∗
1, θ) ≥ U(α∗1, θ)Uα(α∗1, θ) (16)
for all θ ∈ {1, ..., n}.
Proof: We first prove that condition 2 implies condition 1. Consider an
agent φ2 = k(φ1) that is more ambiguity averse than agent φ1, so that the
transformation function k is concave. The condition thus implies that
k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ)))Uα(α
∗
1, θ) ≤ k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ)))Uα(α∗1, θ)
for all θ. Multiplying both side of this inequality by qθφ01(U(α∗1, θ)) ≥ 0 and
summing up over all θ yields
nX
θ=1
qθφ02(U(α
∗
1, θ))Uα(α
∗
1, θ) ≤ k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ)))
nX
θ=1
qθφ01(U(α
∗
1, θ))Uα(α
∗
1, θ) = 0.
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The last equality comes from the assumption that agent φ1 selects portfolio
α∗1. Thus, condition (6) is satisfied, thereby implying that α∗2 is less than α∗1.
We then prove that condition 1 implies condition 2. Without loss of
generality, rank the θs such that U(α∗1, θ) is increasing in θ. By contradiction,
suppose that there exists a θ0 < n such that Uα(α∗1, θ0) ≥ 0 and Uα(α∗1, θ0 +
1) ≤ 0. Select a prior distribution (q1, ..., qn) so that qθ = 0 for all θ except
for θ0 and θ0 + 1. Select qθ0 = q ∈ [0, 1] so that
qφ01(U(α
∗
1, θ0))Uα(α
∗
1, θ0) + (1− q)φ01(U(α∗1, θ0 + 1))Uα(α∗1, θ0 + 1) = 0,
(17)
so that agent φ1 selects portfolio α∗1. Consider any concave transformation
function k. It implies that
nX
θ=1
qθφ02(U(α
∗
1, θ))Uα(α
∗
1, θ)
= qk0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ0)))φ
0
1(U(α
∗
1, θ0))Uα(α
∗
1, θ0)
+(1− q)k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ0 + 1)))φ01(U(α∗1, θ0 + 1))Uα(α∗1, θ0 + 1).
Because Uα(α∗1, θ0+1) ≤ 0 and k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ0+1))) ≤ k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ0))), this
is larger than
k0(φ1(U(α∗1, θ0))) [qφ
0
1(U(α
∗
1, θ0))Uα(α
∗
1, θ0) + (1− q)φ01(U(α∗1, θ0 + 1))Uα(α∗1, θ0 + 1)] = 0.
It implies that condition (6) is violated, implying in turn that α∗2 is larger
than α∗1, a contradiction. ¥
If we rank the θ in such a way that U(α∗1, θ) is monotone in θ, condition
2 is essentially a single-crossing property of function Uα(α∗1, θ). To illustrate,
suppose that u(z) = −A−1 exp(−Az) and exθ ∼ N(θ, σ2), which implies that
U(α, θ) is increasing in θ and is given by equation (2). It implies that Uα(α, θ)
has the same sign as θ−αAσ2. It implies in turn that condition 2 in Lemma
4 is satisfied with θ = αAσ2. Our Lemma implies that ambiguity aversion
29
reduces the demand for the risky asset in the exponential/normal case. This
was shown in Section 2 in the special case of power φ functions.
We need to prove a second lemma in order to prepare for the proof of
Proposition 3.
Lemma 5 Suppose that ex2 is centrally dominated by ex1. Then, Eex2u0(w0 +
αex2) ≤ 0 for any α ≥ 0 such that Eex1u0(w0 + αex1) ≤ 0 .
Proof: By assumption, there exists a positive scalar m such that T2(x) ≤
mT1(x). Integrating by part, we have that
Eex2u0(w0 + αex2) = Z x+
x−
u0(w0 + αx)xdF2(x)
= u0(w0 + αx+)T2(x+)− α
Z x+
x−
u
00
(w0 + αx)T2(x)dx.
This implies that
Eex2u0(w0 + αex2) ≤ m ∙u0(w0 + αx+)T1(x+)− αZ x+
x−
u
00
(w0 + αx)T1(x)dx
¸
= mEex1u0(w0 + αex1).
By assumption, this is nonpositive. ¥
We can now prove Proposition 3. Condition exθ ¹SSD exθ+1 implies that
U(α, θ+1) ≥ U(α, θ), whereas, by Lemma 5, condition exθ ¹CD exθ+1 implies
that Uα(α, θ) ≤ 0 whenever Uα(α, θ + 1) ≤ 0. This latter result implies that
there exists a θ such that (θ − θ)Uα(α, θ) ≤ 0 for all θ. This immediately
yields condition 2 in Lemma 4, which is sufficient for our comparative static
property. ¥
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